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Abstract 
Bayesian analyses are often performed using so-called noninformative priors, with a view to 
achieving objective inference about unknown parameters on which available data depends. 
Noninformative priors depend on the relationship of the data to the parameters over the 
sample space. Combining Bayesian updating – multiplying an existing posterior density for 
parameters being estimated by a likelihood function derived from independent new data that 
depend on those parameters and renormalizing – with use of noninformative priors gives rise 
to inconsistency where existing and new data depend on continuous parameters in different 
ways. In such cases, noninformative priors for inference from only the existing and from only 
the new data would differ, so Bayesian updating would give different final posterior densities 
depending on which set of data was used to derive an initial posterior and which was used to 
update that posterior. I propose a revised Bayesian updating method, which resolves this 
inconsistency by updating the prior as well as the likelihood function, and involves only a 
single application of Bayes' theorem. The revised method is also applicable where actual prior 
information as to parameter values exists and inference that objectively reflects the existing 
information as well as new data is sought. I demonstrate by numerical testing the probability-
matching superiority of the proposed revised updating method, in two cases. 
1. Introduction 
Bayes' theorem, in the continuous parameter case, formally relates the (posterior) estimated 
conditional probability density ( | )p |x θ x  for a parameter vector θ to the conditional 
probability density ( | )p x| x  for a set of observed variables, or sufficient statistics derived 
from them, (data) x, expressed as a function of θ, and a prior probability distribution (prior), 
with density ( )p  , for the parameter vector: 
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The denominator may alternatively be expressed as ( )p
x
x . Where, as here, | ( | )px x  is 
considered as a function of , at fixed data sample values, it is known as the likelihood 
(function), ( )L
x
θ . However, it remains a (joint) probability density for x, not for θ. (In a case 
where the data are discrete, ( | )p x| x   
represents a probability not a probability density.) The 
denominator is independent of θ, and can be viewed as a normalising factor that makes the 
posterior probability sum to unity. Bayes' theorem can be used as a proportionality 
relationship with this factor omitted, with normalisation carried out at the final stage of the 
analysis: 
  | ( | ) ( )p p pθ|x x|θ θθ x x θ θ  (1.2) 
Where data, through the likelihood function, dominates the shape of the posterior density, the 
form of the prior distribution matters little. But where that is not the case, due to the data 
being imprecise – often arising from small sample sizes – the prior may have a major 
influence on parameter inference. The issue of prior selection has generally been considered 
in the case where there is negligible prior information as to parameter values, or where it is 
desired to analyse the data on that basis – as is usual for scientific experiments. Bayes' 
theorem should not be regarded as requiring that ( )p   represent an actual estimated 
unconditional probability density for θ. From the "objective" Bayesian standpoint, the aim is 
rather to determine a prior that is "noninformative" in the sense of not conveying any 
information about parameter values, but which rather "lets the data speak for themselves". 
That is, a prior calculated to achieve inference that reflects to the greatest extent possible even 
very weak data. A noninformative prior does not represent any particular beliefs as to 
parameter values and is not interpretable in probabilistic terms (Bernardo and Smith, 1994). 
Rather, it should be viewed as constituting a mathematical prior or weighting function (Fraser 
et al., 2011). The weighting provided by ( )p   can be seen as counteracting the effect of the 
chosen parameterization, in the light of the likelihood function, and will reflect how, under the 
chosen parameterization, the average informativeness of the data about parameter values 
varies therewith.  
Although subjective Bayesians may be unconcerned about such matters, the 
performance of noninformative priors is often judged by their probability-matching: how 
closely the resulting posterior probabilities agree with repeated-sampling coverage 
probabilities (Kass and Wassermann, 1996). Indeed, Berger and Bernardo (1992) refer to the 
commonly used safeguard of frequentist evaluation of the performance of noninformative 
priors in repeated use, as being historically the most effective approach to discriminating 
among possible noninformative priors.  It is generally, albeit not universally, accepted that an 
acceptable noninformative prior should – at least asymptotically – lead, faster than the general 
sample-size driven O(n
-1/2
) convergence rate, to frequentist validity of Bayesian credible sets. 
That is to say, it should be a probability matching prior (see, e.g., Rubin, 1984; Berger and 
Wolpert, 1984, p. 73; Tibshirani, 1989; Kass and Wasserman, 1996; Mukerejee and Reid, 
1999; Little, 2011).   
Noninformative priors present difficult problems and have given rise to much debate. 
In most cases it appears impossible – even allowing priors to be functions of the data as well 
as of the parameters – to formulate priors that are completely noninformative, in the sense of 
achieving inference that is exactly probability matching. However, there are recognised 
methods for seeking priors that may be expected to have a minimal effect, relative to the data, 
on parameter inference. Jeffreys pioneered the development of noninformative priors for 
continuous parameters, leading both to the original (nonlocation) Jeffreys' prior, referred to in 
this paper simply as Jeffreys' prior, and its location parameter variant. Jeffreys' prior is the 
square root of the determinant of the expected Fisher information matrix ( )h θ :  
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A key feature of Jeffreys' prior is that it corresponds to a natural volume element of a 
Riemannian metric. Such volume elements are invariant under both data transformations and 
reparameterisation and generate locally uniform measures on manifolds, in the sense that 
equal mass is assigned to regions having equal volumes (Kass, 1989; Kass and Wassermann, 
1996). Put another way, Jeffreys' prior is a uniform distribution taking account of the topology 
(Ghosh et al, 2006). As a result, Jeffreys' prior is invariant: for the parameters jointly, 
posterior inference is consistent (i.e., identical when expressed in the same parameterisation) 
under changes of the data and/or parameter variables. Jeffreys' prior can be viewed as a 
density conversion factor between natural volume elements in parameter space and 
corresponding volumes in data space, multiplication by which converts the likelihood 
function from a probability density in data space to a probability density in parameter space.  
In the univariate parameter case it is known (Hartigan, 1965) that when Jeffreys' prior, 
1/2
( )h θ , is used ( denoting a matrix determinant), one-sided Bayesian credible intervals 
are, asymptotically, closer in probability to confidence intervals for the same parameter 
regions – matching to 1(n )O  (Welch, 1965) – than when any other prior is used. If and only 
if , or some monotonic transformation of , is a location parameter with respect to the data or 
some transformation thereof, and the model admits a real-valued sufficient statistic, then one-
sided credible interval and confidence interval probabilities match exactly (Lindley, 1958). 
Where the aim is objective inference in the absence of prior information, it is now generally 
accepted that, as Bernardo and Smith (1994) put it: "In one-dimensional continuous regular 
problems, Jeffreys' prior is appropriate". 
Apart from Jeffreys' priors, probably the best known approach to formulating 
noninformative priors is Bernardo and Berger's reference analysis (Bernardo, 1979; Berger 
and Bernardo, 1992), which involves maximising the (expected value of) missing information 
about the parameters of interest. In a univariate parameter setting, these two approaches 
coincide provided that – as is usually the case – the asymptotic posterior distribution for the 
parameter is normal (Bernardo and Smith, 1994, p. 314). In the multivariate case, Jeffreys' 
prior remains the reference prior for inference about all parameters jointly, taken as a single 
group (Robert, 2007). However, satisfactory marginal inference about a subset of 
parameter(s) of interest is more reliably achieved by reference analysis than by using Jeffreys' 
prior. The least informative, "reference" prior may vary depending on what priority ordering 
for marginal inference is given to individual components or subsets of the parameter vector. 
Berger and Bernardo's ordered reference priors for marginal inference are, like Jeffreys' prior, 
computed from the Fisher information matrix. Additionally, Peers (1965) gave a sufficient 
condition for a prior to be approximately probability-matching, which is also expressed in 
terms of the Fisher information matrix. Accordingly, in general Bayesian parameter inference 
based on a noninformative prior, with the aim of achieving approximate probability-matching, 
requires the availability of the Fisher information matrix pertaining to all the data on which 
that inference is based, and can typically be computed from that matrix. 
Some Bayesians object to the sample space dependence of Jeffreys' and other 
noninformative priors – their dependence on the experiment involved, through its influence on 
the likelihood function and/or the sampling procedure. That dependence violates the so-called 
(strong) likelihood principle, supposedly proved by Birnbaum (1962). However, the 
likelihood principle – which is incompatible with frequentist statistical methodology – is 
doubted by many statisticians, at least insofar as it is applied to statistical inference. See, e.g., 
Evans et al. (1986) and Mayo (2010). More recently, Evans (2013) has shown that the 
theorem Birnbaum proved is incorrectly stated, and Mayo (2013) shows how data may violate 
the likelihood principle while upholding both the weak conditionality and the sufficiency 
principles.   
2. Bayesian updating 
Bayes' theorem is often used to carry out sequential analysis and revision of beliefs, using the 
posterior derived from the application of Bayes' theorem to the results of one experiment, A, 
as the prior for inference based on the results of a second experiment, B. A new posterior is 
derived as the renormalized product of the old posterior (used as a prior) and the likelihood 
function for the second experiment: 
  
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| ( | ) [ ( | ) ( )]p p p pθ|x x x |θ x |θ θx x x x     (2.1) 
This procedure is termed  "Bayesian updating". It is commonly considered, even by objective 
Bayesians, to be a valid means of inference irrespective of the whether or not the new data 
comes from a similar experiment to that involved in the original application of Bayes' theorem 
(see, e.g., Zellner, 1971, p17; Box and Tiao, 1973, p11; Jaynes, 2003, p259; or Sivia, 2006, 
p20). Bayesian updating respects the likelihood principle, since inference depends on the 
evidence provided by experiment B only through its likelihood function. 
This paper shows, through both mathematical analysis and numerical testing, that the 
standard Bayesian updating procedure will generally not result in posterior probabilities that 
achieve optimal probability matching, when, because of differing non-linear data-parameter 
relationships or otherwise, Fisher information matrices differ (up to proportionality) between 
experiments. It also shows how to revise Bayesian updating to overcome this problem. 
I adopt an objective Bayesian position and proceed at present on the basis that no 
actual prior information as to parameter values exists, so that using a noninformative prior is 
appropriate. It is first demonstrated that standard Bayesian updating can produce inconsistent 
results when noninformative priors are used, a fact noted by Hartigan (1964) and by Kass and 
Wasserman (1996). An (expected) Fisher information based approach is used. Jeffreys' prior 
is used to motivate the analysis, but since the key point is that Fisher information – which is 
generally central to noninformative prior formulations – does not update in the same way as 
likelihood, the findings are not limited to where Jeffreys' prior is used.  
For ease of analysis, certain simplifying assumptions are made. It is assumed that the 
probability model is known, dependent on a vector of unknown parameters taking continuous 
values, and to be such that the asymptotic joint parameter posterior distribution is 
(multivariate) normal, as is usually the case. Likelihood functions are assumed to be smooth 
well-behaved functions, twice differentiable at all points. The deficiency identified in standard 
Bayesian updating, and the proposed revisions thereto, are in point however many parameters 
and experiments (each giving rise to one or more data realisations) there are. However, for 
ease of exposition – and also because with a univariate parameter Jeffreys' prior is known to 
provide the best probability matching – only the case with a univariate real-valued parameter 
  and two experiments, A and B, is analysed in detail.  
Suppose that experiments A and B give rise respectively to data Ax and Bx , with 
probability elements 
A | A A
( | )p d 
x x x  and B | B B( | )p d 
x x x  (if the data are discrete Adx  
and Bdx  are inapplicable). It is assumed that Ax and Bx  are conditionally independent given 
, so that (dropping the subscripts on p) if the two experiments are viewed as a single 
composite experiment C giving rise to a data sample C A B{ , }x x x ,  
C C A B A B( | ) ( | ) ( | )p d p p d d    x x x x x x  
where C A Bd d dx x x . The likelihoods 
A
A A( ) ( | )L p  xx and BB B
( ) ( | )L p 
x
x  have 
expected Fisher information (respectively hA and hB) defined by: 
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Since the appropriate noninformative prior is Jeffreys' prior, the inconsistency arising from 
Bayesian updating when the two experiments involved, A and B, embody differing expected 
Fisher information can be demonstrated simply. It suffices to work with proportionality rather 
than equality. Suppose that data from experiment A is analysed first, and Bayes' theorem is 
used with the Jeffreys' prior for that experiment to obtain a posterior density for  : 
  
1/2
A A A|  ( ) ( )p L h  x  (2.4) 
Bayes' theorem is then used again to update the thus-obtained posterior with the likelihood 
from experiment B's data. That gives a posterior density for  reflecting information from 
both experiments' data: 
    
1/2
A B B A B A A|  ( ) | ( ) ( ) ( )p L p L L h      x x x  (2.5) 
Alternatively, if data from experiment B is analysed first, using Bayes' theorem with the 
Jeffreys' prior for that experiment one obtains the following posterior density for : 
  
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Use of Bayes' theorem again to update the thus-obtained posterior with the likelihood from 
experiment A's data sample also gives a posterior density for  reflecting information from 
both experiments' data: 
    
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Since multiplication of likelihoods is commutative, it is evident that from (2.5) and (2.7) that 
   B A A B|  = |p p x x x x  for all   if and only if B A( ) ( )h h  . (If the Fisher information 
matrix determinants, and hence the priors, are proportional, normalisation to unity of total 
probability will ensure equality, not just proportionality, of the posterior densities.) 
Where the probability models for the two experiments A and B have different forms, 
typically reflecting different types of data-parameter relationships or data error distributions, 
their expected Fisher information matrices will not generally have proportionate determinants, 
so the final posterior density for   will depend on the order in which the experiments are 
analysed. This inconsistency indicates that something is wrong. The order in which evidence 
from two experiments is analysed and combined should not affect inference. Kass and 
Wassermann (1996) expressed concern that when using noninformative priors Bayesian 
updating can generate a different posterior depending on the order that data is processed, but 
did not focus on the possibility that the problem lay with Bayesian updating. 
Although the foregoing arguments have been set out for a univariate parameter, they 
generalise immediately to the multivariate case, with the priors, likelihoods and posteriors 
then being joint densities.  
3. Modifying Bayesian updating 
The appropriate noninformative prior to use for parameter inference based on data from both 
experiment A and experiment B is readily found by considering them as a single composite 
experiment, C. Assuming independence (conditional on ) of the two experiments' data, the 
likelihood function for the composite experiment is given by multiplying those for 
experiments A and B: 
C A B A B
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One can likewise express the expected Fisher information for the composite experiment: 
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(where the fact that C A Bd d dx x x  has been used) in terms of that for the separate 
experiments. Using the additivity of logarithms and separating the integrals using the 
conditional independence of Ax and Bx  gives: 
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Since the first integral in each term evaluates to unity and the second integral is the Fisher 
information for the individual experiment, it follows that the Fisher information is additive: 
 C A B( ) ( ) ( )h h h     (3.4) 
Applying Bayes' theorem using Jeffreys' prior,
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C ( )h  , and the likelihood function for the 
composite experiment C: 
  
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C C C| ( ) ( )p L h  x  (3.5) 
which, expressed in terms relating to the underlying separate experiments, gives: 
  
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Since addition and multiplication are commutative, this posterior is, as it logically should be, 
unaffected by the order in which the experimental data is analysed. In order, where Jeffreys' 
prior is used, for Bayesian updating to produce inference that is consistent with that from one-
step Bayesian inference for the combined experiment, it must take the revised form given in 
(3.6). That is to say, separate terms for the likelihood and the Fisher information matrix are 
required, updated respectively by multiplication and by addition. In geometric terms, the 
Fisher information term can be seen as building up a model parameter space metric, which 
becomes denser as more information is obtained, the volume density of the space being the 
square root of the determinant of the metric (Mosegaard and Tarantola, 2002).  
The proposed revised basis of updating is identical if some other noninformative prior 
computed from the Fisher information matrix h, such as a reference prior, is to be used in 
place of Jeffreys' prior.  Suppose that prior takes the form ( ( ))f h  , where f can be any 
function, including one implicitly specified by an algorithm (as in reference analysis). In that 
case, (3.6) is replaced by the more general form: 
  A B A B A B| , [ ( ) ( )] ( ( ) ( ))p L L f h h     x x  (3.7) 
In order to implement the revised updating procedure, it is necessary to maintain separate 
records of the combined (cumulatively multiplied) likelihood functions and of the combined 
(cumulatively added) Fisher information matrices from all experiments carried out to date, 
rather than just a record of the posterior density. Provided that the intended noninformative 
prior depends only on the Fisher information matrix, doing so enables correct revision of the 
posterior density as new data becomes available, whether from a new experiment or from one 
of the already incorporated experiments. It can readily be seen that, no matter how many 
experiments and sets of data are involved, the posterior density derived from the revised 
Bayesian updating method will be identical to that which would arise were all the data to be 
aggregated and analysed simultaneously, as if arising from a single composite experiment. 
At each updating using the revised procedure, first the cumulative sum of the expected 
Fisher information matrices and the cumulative product of the likelihood functions are 
updated to reflect the new experiment and data therefrom. A noninformative prior is then 
computed from the updated Fisher information matrix, and multiplied by the updated product 
of the likelihood functions. The result is normalised to give the updated joint posterior density 
for the parameter vector. Marginal posteriors can then be produced in the usual way by 
integrating out nuisance parameters. In a univariate parameter setting, or for inference as to all 
parameters jointly in a multiparameter case, the appropriate noninformative prior to use would 
be Jeffreys' prior, calculated directly from the determinant of the updated Fisher information. 
Where in a multivariate parameter case marginal inference is to be made about a subset of one 
or more parameters of interest, ordered reference priors could be computed from the full 
Fisher information matrix (Bernardo and Smith, 1994, Proposition 5.30). Alternatively, an 
approximate probability matching prior might be constructed, for instance using the method 
set out in Sweeting (2005). However, should a data-dependent noninformative prior be used, 
then to ensure consistency Bayesian updating would require maintaining a record of the data 
from all the experiments in addition to the cumulative product of their likelihood functions 
and sum of their Fisher information matrices. 
If the Fisher information matrices for the two experiments are identical up to 
proportionality then so will be the Fisher information for the combined experiments: 
C A B A A A( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )h h h h ch kh          . In that event standard Bayesian updating 
needs no modification when using a noninformative prior that is a function of the Fisher 
information matrix, since (3.7) reduces to: 
    A B A B A B A| , [ ( ) ( )] ( ( )) ( ) |p L L f h L p      x x x  (3.8) 
An example is where the second experiment consists of obtaining an additional sample under 
the same setup as in the first experiment.  
4. Incorporation of probabilistic prior information 
Although the foregoing analysis has been undertaken in the context where there is either no 
existing probabilistic information as to parameter values before the experiments under 
consideration, or such information is to be ignored, it applies equally where such information 
exists and is to be incorporated. It is assumed for simplicity that such information is, 
conditional on the parameter value(s), independent of the experimental data involved. When 
such actual prior information exists, one can suppose that it is equivalent to a notional 
observation y with a certain probability density p(y|), from which a posterior density of   
given y has been calculated using Bayes' theorem with a noninformative prior. Doing so was 
proposed by Hartigan (1965), with the thus computed posterior density being employed as the 
prior density representing the existing information in a further application of Bayes' theorem 
(a Bayesian update) in combination with the likelihood function for the actual observation(s). 
Indeed, if the existing information is not treated in the foregoing way, as a likelihood 
function pertaining to a notional observation multiplied by an appropriate noninformative 
prior, then in general the posterior density cannot correctly reflect the combination of the 
existing information with that from the experimental data. That must be so since the issues 
with Bayesian updating that have been identified apply equally where an intentionally 
informative prior density is updated by the probability density of actual observation(s) from a 
single experiment, as they do in the case with two experiments but no incorporation of 
existing information. That informative probabilistic prior information cannot in general be 
correctly incorporated by simply using it as a prior density and applying Bayes' theorem can 
be seen by considering the case where, in the two experiments case, inference from one of the 
experiments on its own gives a posterior density identical to the informative prior density and 
the other experiment is the same as the single experiment in the informative prior information 
case. 
Accordingly, adopting Hartigan's viewpoint is necessary for the correct incorporation 
of actual prior information. However, the proposed revised updating procedure should be used 
rather than simply applying Bayes' theorem twice as proposed by Hartigan. It is therefore 
generally necessary to calculate the Fisher information pertaining to the probability density 
for the notional observation that represents actual prior information. An exception is when the 
Fisher information matrix relating to the notional observation can be seen to be proportional 
to the Fisher information matrix relating to the actual observation(s). 
5. Numerical testing 
Probability matching accuracy of parameter inference resulting from use of the standard and 
the revised Bayesian updating methods is now investigated. Two cases are examined, each 
involving two independent experiments and a univariate parameter for which asymptotic 
normality applies. Since the product of the likelihood functions for the individual experiments 
is identical for both types of updating, differences in posterior inferences arise entirely from 
different priors. Jeffreys' prior is used for all inference, since it is known to produce the best 
probability matching here. Testing involves generating a large number of random data 
samples according to the assumed data distributions, with one or more known parameter 
values. Where upper and lower bounds have to be imposed for computational reasons, they 
are set sufficiently wide for all likelihood functions to have negligible weight beyond the 
bounds. Posterior PDFs are normalised to integrate to unity between the bounds used. The 
posterior probability of the Bayesian one-sided credible prediction intervals – derived from 
the marginal posterior cumulative density functions (CDFs), and invariant under 
reparameterisation – is compared with the corresponding frequentist coverage probability. 
Specifically, the proportions of cases in which the actual parameter value falls below the 
parameter values at which the Bayesian posterior CDFs cross each integral cumulative 
probability percentage point is computed.  For a completely uninformative prior, and if 
Bayesian inference exactly reflected long-run repeated-sampling probabilities, the relationship 
of those proportions with the CDF percentage points should be linear with a unit slope and 
zero intercept, subject to random deviations due to the number of samples being finite.  
Lindley (1958) showed that, whatever prior is used, Bayes one-sided credible regions 
and frequentist confidence intervals cannot always coincide unless a location parameter is 
involved. A location parameter is involved if, for some monotonic transformations of the 
observed and parameter variables, the probability distribution of the transformed observation 
depends only on the difference between the two transformed variables (e.g., Gelman et al, 
2004, p.64). There is an illuminating discussion of Bayesian inference in Fraser and Reid 
(2011), where it is shown how, where there is more than one data variable, curvature (a non-
linear relationship) in the model or in the parameter of interest leads to Bayesian credible 
regions giving results that do not match those from repeated-sampling. Therefore, as the two-
experiment examples considered here involve curvature in the parameter–variable 
relationship, one cannot expect them to give exact probability matching even with the most 
uninformative prior possible.  Nevertheless, with a correctly formulated noninformative prior, 
resulting from use of the revised Bayesian updating method, probability matching should be 
superior to that with an incorrectly formulated prior.  
Example 1: Inference where data likelihoods depend on respectively a parameter and its cube 
Consider experiment A where the datum xA is related to the parameter   by the (location 
parameter) probability model: 
 xA =  + eA    with eA ~ N(0, σA)  (5.1) 
which implies that the likelihood function is: 
  1 2 2A A A A( | ) ( 2 ) exp ( ) / 2p x x       (5.2)  
In such a case the Jeffreys' prior for   is uniform (p( ) = constant), is the reference prior and 
is completely noninformative. Therefore, in the absence of any other relevant information 
about   before analysing experiment A, we can apply (1.2) with p( ) a constant, obtaining:  
 p(|xA)   p(xA| ) (5.3) 
Now consider experiment B, where the datum xB is related to the same parameter 
 
 by the 
probability model: 
 xB =  
3
 + eB   with e ~ N(0, σB)  (5.4) 
which implies that the likelihood function is: 
  1 3 2 2B B B B( | ) ( 2 ) exp ( ) / 2p x x       (5.5)  
In this case, since Jeffreys' prior is invariant under one-to-one parameter transformations and 
Jeffreys' prior for  3 would be uniform (c/f experiment A), under experiment B Jeffreys' prior 
(and the reference prior) for   is proportional to  2. (Conversion of a PDF for  3 into a PDF 
for  using the standard Jacobian formula for transforming a probability density on a change 
of variables (e.g., Sivia, 2006, p.69) involves multiplication by |d 3/d | = 3 2.) Applying 
equation (1.2) using the results of experiment B alone, we therefore have: 
 p(|xB )   p(xB| ) 
 2
 (5.6) 
In physical terms,   might be the radius of a sphere, estimated in experiment A by measuring 
its circumference and in experiment B by measuring its volume, with in each case the 
measurement being subject a normally distributed random error with known standard 
deviation. 
Applying the standard Bayesian updating formula (2.1) to incorporate the results of 
experiment B where Bayesian inference has already been undertaken using the results of 
experiment A, the posterior reflecting the evidence from both experiments is: 
 
  A B B A( | )  ( | ) ( | )p x x p x p x    (5.7) 
 Substituting from (5.3) we obtain: 
 p( |xA xB)   p(xB| )  p(xA| ) (5.8) 
It would be equally acceptable to analyse the results of experiment B first and then to update 
the thereby-derived posterior for   with the results of experiment A, using: 
 
 B A A B( | )   ( | ) ( | )p x x p x p x    (5.9) 
Substituting from (5.6) we obtain: 
   
2
B A A B( | )  ( | ) ( | )p x x p x p x     (5.10) 
Equations (5.8) and (5.10) each represent a posterior PDF for   that reflects the evidence 
from both experiments in accordance with Bayesian updating, using a noninformative 
reference prior for the first experiment analysed.  But they differ by a factor of  2.  
In fact, neither equation (5.8) or (5.10) incorporates a prior that is noninformative for 
analysing the combined results of the two experiments.  And although with enough data from 
either experiment the two posteriors will converge on the same (Gaussian) distribution, with 
weak data the posteriors produced by (5.8) and (5.10) will be very different.  As shown in 
Appendix 1, Jeffreys' prior (and hence the reference prior) for inference based on the 
combined results of experiments A and B is neither uniform nor proportional to  2. Instead, it 
is (per A1.9): 
 2 2 4 1/2( ) ( 9 )A B    
     (5.11) 
Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows that for experiments A and B on their own, using their respective 
uniform and  2 Jeffreys'/reference priors, with the posteriors generated in accordance with 
equations (5.3) and (5.6) respectively, probability matching is very accurate in both cases.  
Panel (b) of Figure 1 shows that for experiments A and B combined, probability matching is 
substantially inaccurate using the Jeffreys'/reference prior for either experiment (in 
accordance with the standard Bayesian updating equations (5.8) and (5.10) respectively), but 
is far more accurate when the Jeffreys'/reference prior (per equation (5.11)) for the combined 
experiments is used, in accordance with the revised Bayesian updating method. 
When using a uniform prior, corresponding to first applying Bayes' theorem to 
experiment A using the reference prior, and then updating the posterior with the results of 
experiment B, rather than the true parameter value lying below the 5th or above the 95th 
percentage point of the posterior CDF in only 5% of instances for both cases, it did so in 
respectively 2.0% and 8.7% of instances.  Using a  2 prior, corresponding to first applying 
Bayes' theorem to experiment B using reference prior, and then updating the posterior with 
the results of experiment A, the corresponding figures were 7.0% and 2.4%.  Using the 
reference prior for the combined experiments, these figures were respectively 5.7% and 5.6%, 
both close to a perfect match. 
 
Example 2: Inference  for Bernoulli trials 
Consider now the canonical Example 9 in Berger and Wolpert (1984), of two experiments 
where either the number of zeros z for a fixed sample size n of Bernoulli i.i.d. random 
variables is counted (experiment A, giving a binomial distribution), or the number of 
observations y is counted until a fixed number r of zeros (failures) occur (experiment B, 
giving a negative binomial distribution). Here the parameter is continuous but the data are 
discrete. Box and Tiao (1973, p.45) noted that the Jeffreys' priors for these two experiments 
differ, and concluded that Bayesian inference from them should differ even when the 
likelihood functions are identical, which they are when z = r and y = n.  The Jeffreys' priors 
they derived for the binomial and negative binomial distribution cases, rederived as (2.8) and 
(2.16) in Appendix 2, were respectively: 
 
1/2 1/2( ) (1 )        (5.12) 
and  
 
1 1/2( ) (1 )     
 
(5.13) 
where  is the probability of the outcome being counted (here, failures) occurring in any trial.   
Berger and Wolpert (1984) pointed out that the analysis by Box and Tiao violated the 
(strong) likelihood principle. However, if one regards a noninformative prior as reflecting 
how informative the data can be expected to be about different parameter values, one would 
expect a noninformative prior to increase more rapidly as  decreases in the negative binomial 
case. That is because the lower  is, the greater the expected number of trials to obtain a fixed 
number of the outcomes being counted, and hence the more information the data will contain 
about  compared to the binomial case, where the number of trials is fixed. 
Consider now inference based on the combined results of two independent 
experiments, one of each type. As per equation (A2.25), Jeffreys' prior for the combined 
experiments, used in the revised method of Bayesian updating, has the form: 
 
1/2 1 1/2( ) ( ) (1 )r n         (5.14) 
The difference in the two priors, and hence of inference in a small sample case, is material 
only if the probability of the outcomes being counted is small.  The case where the probability 
of failure varies between 0.01 and 0.11, with 40 trials and 2 failures (zeros), is therefore 
considered. Panel (a) of Figure 2 shows that for experiments A and B on their own, using 
their respective Jeffreys' priors, probability matching is in each such case much better than 
where the Jeffreys' prior appropriate for the other experiment is used. This supports Box and 
Tiao's analysis and provides evidence against the likelihood principle.  
Panel (b) of Figure 2 shows that for experiments A and B combined, probability 
matching is much more accurate when Jeffreys' prior for the combined experiments is used, as 
under the revised method of Bayesian updating, than when Jeffreys' prior for either separate 
experiment is used (according to which is analysed first), as would be the case under standard 
Bayesian updating.  
6. Discussion 
In the continuous parameter case, from an objective viewpoint standard Bayesian updating is 
unsatisfactory unless all the inferential data involved comes either from the same experiment 
or from experiments that all imply the same noninformative prior. In other cases Bayesian 
updating needs to be modified so that Bayes' theorem is applied once only, to the 
multiplicatively combined likelihoods from the data from all the experiments (assuming 
conditionally independence of the experimental data), using whatever is considered a suitable 
noninformative prior for inference about the parameter(s) of interest from the combined data 
(e.g., Jeffreys' prior or a targeted reference prior). Except where a data-dependent prior is to 
be used, such a noninformative prior would generally be computed from the expected Fisher 
information for the combined experiments, being the sum of that for the individual 
experiments. 
The problem with standard Bayesian updating in the continuous parameter case arises 
because the likelihood function for observed data does not contain all the information 
provided by an experiment, and nor – even when it is exactly probability matching – does a 
Bayesian posterior density preserve all the information necessary for correct inference when 
dissimilar additional data is subsequently introduced. Since Fisher information for 
independent experiments combines additively, the proposed revision to standard Bayesian 
updating can be accommodated by preserving the cumulative multiplicatively-combined 
(joint) likelihood function and the cumulative additively-combined Fisher information matrix 
in place of just the (joint) posterior density for the parameters, provided that a data-dependent 
prior is not used.  
Numerical testing results indicate superiority of the proposed revised updating 
approach over standard Bayesian updating, in terms of probability matching under repeated 
testing. These results support the view that the inconsistency problem mentioned in Kass and 
Wasserman (1996) reflects a deficiency in the standard Bayesian updating formula, not a 
problem with noninformative priors. 
As discussed in Section 4, the identified shortcomings of standard Bayesian updating 
also potentially arise, and can likewise be overcome, in the case where there is only one set of 
experimental data but probabilistic prior information exists as to parameter values. That is 
because an informative prior density can be viewed as arising from the application of Bayes' 
theorem to a likelihood function for a notional observational that reflects the actual prior 
information, using a noninformative prior derived from the Fisher information for that 
likelihood function. That noninformative prior may differ from the one implied by the Fisher 
information for the actual data likelihood function. If so, the revised Bayesian updating 
method should be used in order to correctly combine prior information and experiment data 
for inferential purposes.  
 
Appendix 1: Derivation of the Jeffreys'/reference prior for two experiments involving a 
location parameter model but with data relating to different functions of the parameter 
Consider two experiments, A and B, providing information on parameter . In experiment A, 
function fA() is measured inaccurately by variable xA, such that p(xA-|) = f(e), where e = (xA 
- fA())/σA  represents standardised measurement errors in xA, known to have a Gaussian 
distribution with zero mean and standard deviation σA.  In experiment B, function fB() is 
measured inaccurately by variable xB, such that p(xB- fB()|) = f(e), where e = (xB - fB())/σB 
represents standardised measurement errors in xB, known to have a zero mean Gaussian 
distribution with standard deviation σB. The aim is to find a noninformative reference prior 
which permits objective inference as to the posterior distribution of   based on analysing the 
combined results of experiments A and B.  Since the regularity conditions required for the 
posterior for  to be asymptotically normal apply, the noninformative reference prior ( )   is 
Jeffreys' prior, the square root of the expected Fisher information ( )h   (Bernardo and Smith, 
1994, pp 287-292 and 314). 
Defining the two likelihood functions involved as: 
 
 1 2 2( | ) ( 2 ) exp ( ( )) / 2A A A A Ap x x f       (A1.1) 
 
 1 2 2( | ) ( 2 ) exp ( ( )) / 2B B B B Bp x x f       (A1.2) 
The expected Fisher information is: 
 
 
2
2
( ) ( | ) ( | ) log ( | ) ( | )
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x x
h p x p x p x p x dx dx    
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
 
 
 (A1.3) 
where the integrals are over (-∞,∞).   We first calculate  the derivative: 
   
2 2
1 2 2 1 2 2
2 2
log ( | ) ( | ) log( 2 ) ( ( )) / 2 log( 2 ) ( ( )) / 2A B A A A A B B B Bp x p x x f x f       
 
       
 
 
  2 2 2 2' '' ' ''( ( ) ( ( )) ( )) ( ( ) ( ( )) ( ))A A A A A B B B B Bf x f f f x f f                (A1.4) 
Therefore: 
 2 2 2 2' '' ' ''( ) ( | ) ( | ) ( ( ) ( ( )) ( )) ( ( ) ( ( )) ( ))
A B
A B A A A A A B B B B B A B
x x
h p x p x f x f f f x f f dx dx                 
  (A1.5) 
Since ( | ) 1
A
A A
x
p x dx  ; ( | ) 1
B
B B
x
p x dx   : 
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x x
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Now, ( | ) ( )
A
A A AA
x
p x x dx f 
 
and ( | ) ( )
B
B B BB
x
p x x dx f   since they are the means of 
Gaussian distributions with central parameters of respectively ( )Af   and ( )Bf  .  Therefore 
the second term in each integral ingrates to zero, giving: 
 
2 2 2 2' '( ) ( | ) ( ) ( | ) ( )
A B
A A A A B B B B
x x
h p x f dx p x f dx         
 
(A1.6) 
which reduces to: 
 
2 2 2 2' '( ) ( ) ( )A A B Bh f f    
    (A1.7) 
from which it follows that the noninformative prior 
1/2( ) ( )h    is given by: 
 
2 2 2 2 1/2' '( ) ( ( ) ( ) )A A B Bf f     
    (A1.8) 
In the case of experiments A and B in Example 1 in Section 5, fA() =  and fB() =  
3
, 
implying that f 'A() = 1 and f 'B() = 3 
2
.  Therefore, by (A1.8) Jeffreys' prior is: 
 
2 2 4 1/2( ) ( 9 )A B    
  
  (A1.9) 
Appendix 2. Derivation of the Jeffreys'/reference prior for Bernoulli experiments  
a) Experiment A: Fixed number of trials – Binomial distribution  
Let the probability of success in any trial be θ, the specified number of trials be n, and the 
number of successes that are achieved be y. Then: 
 
( | , ) (1 )y n y
n
y
P y n   
 
  
 
 (A2.1) 
where P() represents probability, not probability density, since y is a discrete variate. 
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 (A2.2) 
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 (A2.3) 
We now compute Fisher's information (matrix) h(θ), being: 
2
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  (A2.4) 
which since |( , ) 1
y
P y n   simplifies to: 
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y
h n y          
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  (A2.5) 
It is a standard result for the binomial distribution that E(y|θ,n) = n θ, hence: 
  
2 2 2 1( ) (1 ) (1 ) ( 2 )h n n              (A2.6) 
which upon simplification becomes 
 
1 2 1( ) (1 2)(1 ) (1 )h n n             (A2.7) 
Jeffreys' noninformative prior is π(θ)= |det( h(θ))|1/2, so 
 
1/2 1/2( ) (1 )       (A2.8) 
b) Experiment B: Fixed number of successes – Negative binomial (Pascal) distribution  
Let the probability of success in any trial be θ, the specified number of successes be r, and the 
number of trials that are required to achieve the specified number of successes be z. Then: 
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1
( | , ) (1 )r z r
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 (A2.9) 
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 (A2.10) 
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
 (A2.11) 
Fisher's information (matrix) h(θ) is: 
2
2 2
2
1
1
( ) ( | , ) log ( | , ) (1 ) ( ( )(1 ) )r z r
z
z
r
h P z r P z r r z r      

  

   
        
   

 
(A2.12) 
which since |( , ) 1
z
P z r   simplifies to: 
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  (A2.13) 
It is a standard result for the negative binomial distribution that E(z| θ,r) = r / θ, hence: 
 
2 2( ) (1 ) ( / )h r r r         (A2.14) 
which upon simplification becomes 
 
2 1( ) (1 )h r      (A2.15) 
Jeffreys' noninformative prior is π(θ)= |det( h(θ))|1/2, so 
 
1 1/2( ) (1 )       (A2.16) 
c) Combination of experiments A and B – Binomial and negative binomial distributions 
Defining the variables as in cases a) and b), we have: 
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(A2.18) 
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 (A2.20) 
which since |( , ) 1
y
P y n  , |( , ) 1
z
P z r  , E(y|θ,n) = n θ and E(z| θ,r) = r / θ simplifies 
to: 
 
2 2 2 2 2( ) ( )(1 ) ( (1 ) ) ( / )(1 )h r n r n r                     (A2.21) 
 
2 2 2 2 2 2( ) (1 ) { (1 2 ) ( ) ((1 2 ) ) ( )}h r n r n r                       (A2.22) 
 
2 2( ) (1 ) { (1 ) (1 )}h r n            (A2.23) 
 
2 1( ) ( ) (1 )h r n        (A2.24) 
Jeffreys' noninformative prior for the experiments combined is therefore: 
 
1/2 1 1/2( ) ( ) (1 )r n         (A2.25)
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Fig 1: Coverage probabilities – Example 1. Experiments measure: A – parameter; B – cube of 
parameter. 
x-axis: 0–100 percentage points of the posterior CDF for the parameter. 
y-axis: proportion of 20,000 randomly drawn experimental measurements for which the 
parameter value at each posterior CDF percentage point exceeds the true parameter value. 
Panel (a): inference based on data from each separate experiment, using the correct 
Jeffreys'/reference prior for that experiment. 
Panel (b): inference based on combined experiments, using the Jeffreys'/reference  prior for 
experiment A (green line), that for experiment B (blue line) or that for the combined 
experiments (red line).   
Black dotted lines show perfect frequentist coverage (both panels). 
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Fig 2: Coverage probabilities – Example 2. Bernoulli experiments: A – binomial; B – 
negative binomial. 
x-axis: 0–100 percentage points of the posterior CDF for the parameter. 
y-axis: proportion of 2,000 randomly drawn experimental measurements at each of 100 
parameter values randomly drawn between 0.89 and 0.99 for which the parameter value at 
each posterior CDF percentage point exceeds the true parameter value. 
Panel (a): inference based on data from each separate experiment.  Green dashed and red 
dashed-dotted lines are using the Jeffreys' prior appropriate to the relevant experiment, being 
respectively a binomial and a negative binomial experiment.  Blue and magenta short-dashed 
lines are for the same experiments but with the priors swapped.  
Panel (b): inference based on combined experiments, using the Jeffreys' prior for experiment 
A (green dashed line), that for experiment B (dash-dotted blue line) or that for the combined 
experiments (red short-dashed line).  Black dotted lines show perfect frequentist coverage 
(both panels). 
